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The three-legged stool of
corporate governance reform
by Jayne Barnard

In March 1998, the London Stock Exchange issued some proposed changes

to its Listing Rules. This document incorporates what has become known
as the 'Combined Code' of corporate governance practices, a project of the
Committee on Corporate Governance ('the Hampel Committee').
The Combined Code seeks to assemble in one place a code

of best practice on corporate governance matters, the
substance of which has previously been articulated in
three separate documents, the Cadbury Committee Report
(1992), the Greenbury Committee Report (1995) and the
Hampel Committee Report (1998).
The Stock Exchange's publication of the Combined Code,
together with proposed changes in the Listing Rules, was part of
a deal reached with the Hampel Committee — the objective is to
have a uniform understanding of what the corporate governance
of public companies should look like (the Combined Code) and
to have a mechanism of persuasion by which public companies
that do not observe the agreed-upon best practices can be
shamed into moving in the right direction (the Listing Rules). In
a nutshell, the proposed Listing Rules would require listed
companies to report on any areas in which they fail to observe
the best practices prescribed in the Combined Code (para.
12.43A(b)). In addition, listed companies must provide a
narrative summary of the ways in which they have sought to fulfil
the general principles set forth in the Hampel Committee
Report (para. 12.43A(a)).

The theory behind this structure is that peer- and
shareholder-pressure will stimulate those companies that fail to
comply with the Combined Code's prescriptions to improve
their governance profile. There is some evidence that this
mechanism has been effective in the past, particularly as regards
growing compliance with the Cadbury Committee's
recommendations (see Alice Belcher, 'Regulation by the Market:
The Case of the Cadbury Code and Compliance Statement',
1995 J Bus L at p. 321).
The Cadbury, Greenbury, and Hampel projects and the
Combined Code, like similar projects in the US, represent a

laudatory effort at self-regulation by corporate leaders. Selfregulation, earnestly embraced, can go a long way towards
changing behaviour. But it is fair to question whether selfregulation alone, or self-regulation as abetted by essentially
benign Listing Rules, can provide the stimulus necessary to
ensure that public companies achieve the desired measure of
reform.
My scepticism is based, in part, on a tradition of multiple
sources of persuasion. In the US, self-regulation (and selfcorrection generated by adverse press coverage) forms just a
small piece of the web of influences that has helped shaped
corporate governance practices in American public companies.
More significant are a triumvirate of influences which are
virtually non-existent in the UK:
(1) shareholder enforcement devices;
(2) direct regulation by the government; and
(3) corporate criminal responsibility.
A number of other, less salient, devices also influence
corporate governance in the US. These 'mechanisms of
deputization' include a number of statutes that
empower various constituencies — employees,
customers, competitors, outside accountants, and
even random citizens — to play a role in corporate
governance reform.
What follows is largely a recapitulation of these
sources of influence, together with some commentary
on how they have contributed to the successes of corporate
governance in the US. I do not take the position that the US
model provides exclusive guidance for other markets in
attempting to implement corporate governance reform. It is
helpful, however, to consider how the mechanisms we will
examine in these pages can:
(1) compound the simple influence that self-regulation
provides;
(2)

empower shareholders and

others to play a more active
of corporate governance

role in the improvement
practices; and

(3) create an environment of 'multiple awarenesses,' in which
corporate executives and non-executive directors are
constantly attuned to the expectations under which they
are supposed to operate.
The reader can decide for him/herself whether these sources
of multiple awareness are so confining as to interfere with the
profit-malting objectives of the corporate governance enterprise.
(The Hampel Committee has cautioned that attention to
'compliance' and keeping out of trouble may in same cases
inhibit risk taking and the appropriate pursuit of profit, see
Hampel Committee Report para. 3.7.) The fact that US
corporate profits and stock market prices are at an all-time high
suggests, but does not compel, a contrary conclusion.

SHAREHOLDER ENFORCEMENT
The first source of reinforcement that self-regulators can turn
to in the US is the powerful and ubiquitous shareholders'
derivative suit. Accommodated by every state statute under
which American companies are incorporated, and facilitated in
federal courts by the Feder-al Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23.1), the shareholders' derivative suit
is the primary mechanism by which, the traditional norms of
directorial behaviour — the duties of due care, loyalty and
attention — are enforced. Most of the more notorious (and
sometimes troubling) examples of the use of this mechanism
come to us from the state courts of Delaware: four cases in
Particular, Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985);
MacAndrews & Forbes v Revlon Inc 506 A 2d 173 (Del 1985);
Paramount Communications Inc v QVC Inc (In re Paramount
Communications Inc Shareholders' Litigation) 637 A 2d 34 (Del
1994) and In re Caremark International Inc Derivative Litigation 698

A 2d 959 (Del Ch 1996), define the genre and its reach.
In Smith v Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed
the slipshod practices of a prestigious board in Chicago and
concluded that the haste with which they had approved a $7 15m
take-over bid failed to comply with the minimum requirements
for 'due care'. Noting that the board had spent less than three
hours considering the terms of the deal, had discouraged
alternative bidders and had failed to employ an investment
banker to ratchet up the price of the company, the Supreme
Court found that the company's individual directors — both
executive and non - executive — could be held personally liable for
the difference between the sale price actually achieved for the
company and some higher, 'fairer' price. The case was ultimately
settled for (and the shareholders ultimately received) an
additional $23.5m ($18m of which is said to have been paid to
the plaintiffs' attorneys).
The Revlon case involved a hostile take-over attempt by Pantry
Pride Inc (whose CEO (Chief Operating Officer), Ronald
Perelman, was regarded as a parvenu by the target's incumbent
management) of the cosmetics giant, Revlon Inc. Thwarted by
Revlon, Pantry Pride and some of Revlon's shareholders sued the
company and the Supreme Court held that, where the sale of a
company is inevitable, the incumbent board must permit an
auction to occur, even if management prefers one of the bidders.
To do otherwise would violate the directors' duty to the
shareholders. The QVC case reaffirmed the Revlon decision. In
this case, also involving the efforts of a target corporation to fend
off the advances of a so-called unsuitable bidder, the Supreme
Court ruled once again that, where a change of control is

inevitable, the incumbent board's only duty is to secure the best
value reasonably available to the stockholders. (Both Revlon and
QVC involved requests for direct judicial intervention into the
decisions of a corporate board. By contrast, Smith v Van Gorkom
and Caremark involved requests for monetary compensation.)
Caremark arguably represents the high-water mark of judicial
control over directorial functions. The case involved a provider
of medical services charged with multiple felonies. Specifically,
Caremark was charged with violating federal and state laws
prohibiting providers from paying any form of kickback to
physicians for referring Medicare patients. The company
ultimately settled these charges by paying $29m in criminal
fines, $130m in civil damages, and $5.5m in miscellaneous
charges. (Caremark also entered into an agreement with the US
Department of Health and Human Services to create a modern
compliance program. It later paid an additional $98.5m to
reimburse private insurers.)

USEFUL DETERRENT
imposing criminal liability on corporate defendants, as opposed to
the individuals responsible for the crime, is not without its critics in
Ow US (see, e.g., Jeffrey S Parker, The Blunt Instrument in Debating
Corporate Crime (INS Lofquist, MA Cohen and GA Rabe, eds 1997);
Jennifer Arlen, 'The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability', 23 Sof83(L19t4e).uAglsa,idno
foolproof way to ensure that corporate governance practices are
improved. Nevertheless, without the possibility of criminal
prosecution and the substantial fines that can result from conviction,
many more corporations would undoubtedly engage in clandestine
illegal acts.

The question in the derivative suit was whether Caremark's
directors could be held liable to the shareholders for any portion
of these payments. In fact that question was never specifically
decided, because the case was settled and the court was asked
merely to confirm, as required by law, that the settlement was
'fair and reasonable'. The settlement did not involve any
monetary payment, other than attorneys' fees. The heart of the
settlement was the creation of a board-level Compliance and
Ethics Committee and some other prophylactic gestures. In
deciding that the answer was 'yes', Chancellor Allen (in dictum)
stated that:
`[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to
assure that a corporate information and reporting system, which the
board concludes is adequate, exists, and
failure to do so under some
circumstances may, in theory at least, render a director liable for losses
caused by non-compliance with applicable legal standards.'

Though this language has been dismissed as 'not a statute or
rule, not a holding of the Supreme Court, not on appeal, not
scary and not necessarily right or wrong' by Delaware Chief
Justice Norman Veasey, quoted in 'Corporate Compliance Issues
After Caremark', Carp Off &Dir Liability, Lit Rep, 11 June 1997, it
has had a powerful impact. In fact, together with the US
Sentencing Guidelines discussed below, the Caremark decision
has brought about a revolution in board attitudes towards inhouse compliance programs. Companies have scrambled to
establish credible compliance procedures. Consultants have
devised 'best practices' for the creation of a compliance
program. Not surprisingly, experienced compliance officials are
now able to command 'top dollar'.

The derivative suit is not an unfettered right, and shareholders
are often frustrated by the procedural and doctrinal
impediments which are frequently placed in their way. Two of
the most recurring vex.ations are the necessity of making a prelitigation demand (see Marx v Akers 88 NY 2d 187; 666 NE 2d
1034 (Ct App NY 1996)) — exploring the history of the demand
requirement and its varying applications in a number of states —
and the pre-emptive capacity of 'special litigation committees'
(committees comprised of disinterested board members who are
authorised to request the court dismiss the suit, where it is
thought not to be in the best interests of the corporation) (see
Cuker v Mikalauskas 547 Pa 600; 692 A 2d 1042 (Pa 1997) —
exploring the use of special litigation committees and adopting
the guidelines set out by the American 'Law Institute (ALI) for
determining when the requests of a special litigation committee
should be honored. The business judgment rule itself (giving a
presumption of validity to most directorial decisions) and
especially the application of that rule to decisions regarding
executive compensation (see Zupnick v Goizueta 698 A 2(1 384
(Del Ch 1997) — dismissing a complaint alleging that a grant of
stock options represented 'corporate waste' — are two other
impediments that often limit shareholders' ability to implement
the owners' will.
Even with all of its shortcomings, however, it is hard to
imagine what the state of corporate governance in the US would
be today were the derivative suit not available as a
backdrop against which most corporate
governance decisions are made. Certainly the
anticipation of litigation shapes many board practices
today. Moreover the emerging willingness of
institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs in
shareholders' derivative suits gives those investors an
important new weapon to use in the enforcement of governance
norms. Which is, of course, as it should be. Back room cajoling,
high-stakes negotiating, and even the publication of '
non-performing targets' lists can only go so far in achieving
behavioral reform. The possibility of personal liability, or direct
court intrusion into specific governance decisions, is the single
most effective tool in enforcing directors' fiduciary duties in
American corporations today

GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT
In the US, the direct enforcement of directors' common law
duties comes via the shareholders' derivative suit. There are
other, indirect, forms of enforcement, however, that originate
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC's
authority, like that of any federal agency, is circumscribed by its
enabling legislation. This means that the SEC cannot directly
require companies to alter their corporate governance practices
— in the US, corporate governance is a matter of state, not
federal law (see Business Roundtable v SEC, 905 F 2d 406 (DC Cir
1990)). But by regulating the public disclosures of public
companies and occasionally by intervening in disputes regarding
proxy solicitation, which is also within its jurisdiction, the SEC
has some powerful tools with which it can influence governance
of public companies. This is certainly true of companies in the
financial services industry; over which the SEC has expanded
powers. It is also true, however, of garden variety public
companies whose directors have been slacking on the job.
For example, in September 1997, the SEC issued a widelydiscussed report (-ensuring the directors of WR Grace & Co for

failing to insure that the company had adequately disclosed some
remarkable features of the former CEO's compensation package
(see In the Matter of WR Grace &Co, SExchangeAtRlC3439157, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2038).
Specifically, the former CEO was given the use of a companyowned apartment with a market value of $3m and provided with
a cook, driver, secretaries, nurses, and the use of the corporate
jet. 'The value of these perquisites, when ultimately disclosed,
was over $3m per year According to the SEC, the directors, both
inside and outside, who signed off on the company's annual
report, were required to make sure that these items were
adequately disclosed. (The SEC has imposed detailed
requirements regarding disclosure of executive compensation
schemes. See SEC Exchange Act Rel 34-31327 (Executive
Compensation Disclosure) (1992) describing in detail how
executive compensation decisions are to be communicated to
shareholders). By failing to interrogate the company's disclosure
counsel, 'telling counsel exactly what they knew about the
benefits, and asking specifically whether the benefits should be
disclosed,' WR Grace's directors 'did not fulfil their obligations
under the federal securities laws'. Explicit in the SEC's recitation
of this matter was a condemnation of WR Grace's 'corporate
culture' and the excessive influence the former CEO held over
the board. Implicit in the SEC's report, moreover, was a
critsmofWRGae'xcutivrmnopaces.

In 1994, the SEC issued a similar report reviewing charges
that the CFO and other top executives of The Cooper
Companies Inc, a medical supply manufacturer, had illegally
used the company's funds to engage in securities fraud (In the
Matter of The Cooper Companies Inc, as it relates to the conduct of
Cooper's board of' directors, Exchange Act Rel 34-35082, 1994
SEC LEXIS 3975). Commenting on the failure of Cooper's
board to respond adequately to these charges — indeed, the
board appointed one of the wrongdoers to serve as CEO, and
gave him an off-site office from which he continued to run the
company — the SEC concluded that Cooper's board had failed to
take 'immediate and decisive corrective action.' The message
was clear: when directors harbour defrauders, they, too, can be
held liable for violations of federal law
The SEC has issued reports like these only sparingly; but they
do capture the attention of top business leaders and their
lawyers. A public castigation from the SEC, even when
unaccompanied by a specific enforcement action, has a powerful
impact. The impact is even greater, of course, when the SEC uses
its full range of enforcement powers to seek a cease-and-desist
order against a company and its executives (see, e.g., In the Matter
of Lee Pharmaceuticals, Exchange Act Rel 34-39843, 1998 SEC
LEXIS 691), or to seek injunctive relief (including an order of
restitution) against corporate top executives in a federal court
proceeding (see, e.g., SEC v Eddie Antar 54 F 3(1 770 (3rd Cir
1995)).
In short, the SEC has a wide range of tools — from its bully
pulpit to its power to fine and sanction — that arc employed in

the cause of' corporate governance reform. Without the
presence of a vigilant SEC, the vast array of public companies in
the US (now totalling close to 20,000) would be far more prone
to egregious lapses by their managements than is now the case.

C RIM I NAL LIABILITY
One might think it odd to refer to the federal criminal law as
a mechanism of corporate governance reform, especially in a
culture that does not recognize corporate criminal liability. In
the US however, criminal liability itself and especially the
existence of the US Sentencing Guidelines both have a
profound, if' often belated, impact on the ways in which
companies are governed. For example, in recent years, a number
of public companies have been prosecuted criminally (or
threatened with prosecution) in ways that had a direct impact on
the companies' corporate governance practices and also on their
personnel. In addition to the Caremark case, discussed above, two
other recent examples — perhaps the best, but by no means the
only ones — give a sense of how this mechanism can work. In
each case, the criminal law violations were clearly symptomatic
of systemic management problems and a lack of effective
leadership at the top.

overcharges might total as much as $500m. Together with
criminal penalties, Columbia/HCA's exposure could be more
than twice that much.
Suddenly Scott and the company's president resigned and a
new CEO was appointed. Within a few days, Scott's successor,
Dr Thomas F Frist Jr, called for 'a complete overhaul of the
aggressive culture established by Mr Scott', noting that, as a
director, he had never been informed that there were any
concerns relating to the company's Medicare reimbursement
submissions. Frist promised to revamp the relationship between
the CEO and Columbia/HCAs board. Within a few weeks,
Columbia/HCA had appointed a full-time senior vice president
for ethics, compliance and corporate responsibility. A few
months later, the new CEO appointed three new outside
directors to Columbia/HCA's board. The point, Frist
emphasized, was to get away from Scott's old cronies and to
appoint directors with a level of maturity and experience that
reflected Columbia's size and role in the health care industry
The company also announced a corporate reorganisation plan
that would include a significant spin-off 'The Government
actually did us a favour', allowed Frist, 'because it let us address
an underlying issue, and that was the way you go about running
this kind of company'.

Archer Daniels Midland Co
In June 1995 the FBI raided the Decatur, Illinois,
headquarters of Archer Daniels Midland Co (ADM), looking for
evidence of price axing. ADM, an international leader in
processed foods, was later charged with conspiracy to fix prices
in the lysine and citric acid markets. When the dust had settled,
ADM had paid $100m in criminal fines plus another $100m to
settle civil lawsuits (including a shareholders' derivative suit
brought against the directors for their negligence). On the plus
side, the company's autocratic chairman and CEO, Dwayne
Andreas, had been forced to retire as the CEO; his 'heir
apparent', son Mickey Andreas, had been removed from the
order of succession (he had, after all, been indicted in the pricefixing scheme); institutional investors had been activated and, at
the October 1995 shareholders' meeting, had made a strong
showing in opposition to the re-election of the board. By 1996,
the board had been reduced from 17 to 12 members, of whom
three were new and ostensibly independent and a new CEO had
been appointed. Finally, by 1997, ADM was no longer the
lowest-scoring company in Business Week's annual 'best and worst
of the boards' league table. As part of the settlement of a
shareholders' suit, ADM agreed that only outside directors who
were not on the board at the time of the price-fixing scandal,
could nominate the 1997 slate of directors.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation
In the summer of 1997, word leaked out of a federal
investigation of grievous overcharges against state and federal
funders by Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corporation, an
American corporate giant owning 380 hospitals. The allegations
suggested that Columbia/HCA had falsified thousands of
reimbursement submissions, `upcoding' the levels of care
provided and requiring unnecessary tests. All this had occurred
in an environment of intensive growth and expansion. The
driven CEO of Columbia/HCA, Richard L Scott, had set profit
growth targets of 15-20% per year. This had resulted in deep
cost cutting with resulting allegations of frequent faulty
treatments. Rumours suggested that the amount of the

UK CONTRASTED
In the UK, a business environment which, on the surface at least,
loksmuchietanUS,myofhecanisup
which WC rely in the US are weak or non-existent. This suggests

two possibilities:
(1) British business leaders are less rapacious and better behaved than
American business leaders and do not require the web of
enforcement mechanisms that Americans require to keep them on
the right course; or
(2) British business leaders are just as self-serving and/or negligent as

American business leaders but, because there are so few
mechanisms by which their misconduct can be detected, are
getting away with a great deal of improper conduct.
1 doubt that either is entirely the case. Still, the differences in the
systems are striking. It is fair to wonder if these differences are the
result of historical quirks or of genuine cultural differences.

Imposing criminal liability on corporate defendants, as

opposed to the individuals responsible for the crime, is not
without its critics in the US (see, e.g., Jeffrey S Parker, 'The
Blunt Instrument' in Debating Corporate Crime (WS Lofquist, MA
Cohen and GA Rabe, eds 1997); Jennifer Arlen, 'The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability', 23 J Legal Stud
833 (1994)). Also, it is not a foolproof way to ensure that
corporate governance practices are improved. Nevertheless,
without the possibility of criminal prosecution and the
substantial fines that can result from conviction, many more
corporations would undoubtedly engage in clandestine illegal
acts. 'This is because the more conventional mechanisms for
enforcing managerial norms — the shareholders' derivative suit
and routine directorial monitoring — are unlikely to be effective
in most areas of corporate crime because:
(1) shareholders have little access to the necessary
information;
(2)

there is little incentive for shareholders to act when the

criminal conduct is profitable;

(3) in the absence of some reward mechanism, shareholders'
lawyers also have no incentive to convey a report of
corporate crime; and

• False Claims Act activated by any person (typically an employee);

(4) these same infirmities largely apply to members of the
board of directors. Absent a stringent compliance program
specifically involving the board (see below), directors are
unlikely to be effective law enforcement agents.

•

In addition to the existence of corporate criminal
responsibility, a related influence on corporate governance in the
US is the US Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, adopted
in 1991 (USSG ch 8). These guidelines which govern the way in
which corporations are sentenced (e.g. they determine the
amount of the fine to be paid) include a number of
incentives for companies to take prophylactic
action to avoid prosecution. The strongest of these I
incentives is the provision that enables a company that
has adopted 'an effective program to prevent and
detect violations of the law' (in the vernacular, a
'compliance program') to receive a substantial
reduction in any criminal fines incurred (USSG s.
8C2.5(f)). The elements of an effective program — including the
appointment of high-level executives to ensure that it is being
observed from the `top down' — are clearly set out in the
Sentencing Guidelines (USSG s. 8A1.2, App note (k)). The
result of this provision, together with the impact of the Caremark
case, discussed above, has been a dramatic increase in corporate
compliance programs, many of which involve the board of
directors. In addition a number of recent criminal cases have
been resolved by the company agreeing:
(1) to fire key individuals and/or give them up for individual
prosecution; and
(2) to create a strong compliance program, sometimes under
monitoring by the court.
In these cases, too, the board has often been involved. Legal
advisors to corporations have recognised that the single best way
to avoid corporate misconduct, with its attendant exposure to
significant fines and adverse publicity, is to involve executives —
including the directors — in the process of detection and
deterrence. The sentencing guidelines have encouraged this
awareness.

MECHANISMS OF DEPUTIZATION
There are several other, less direct, sources of influence over
corporate governance practices. These include statutory and
common law provisions, but each provides a mechanism by
which non-participants in corporate governance activities can
play an important role in unveiling misconduct, and can often be
compensated far their services. The theory, if there is one, is that
shareholders, being distanced from the decisions that give rise to
corporate misconduct, cannot alone be empowered to bring
wrongdoing executives to heel. Consigning detection of
wrongdoing to the government, either at the SEC or through
investigation of criminal charges, is also insufficient, even in an
administration committed to pursuing corporate crime. Rather,
a complex web of law enforcement mechanisms, with a wide
range of incentives and persons authorized to initiate them, is
the best guarantee that executives (and non-executives) will
honour their societal obligations. In a nutshell, these
mechanisms, and the people who have standing to activate them,
include:

•

•

•

•

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act activated by public
accountants;
Federal antitrust statutes activated by any injured person
(typically a competitor but sometimes a consumer);
Federal anti-discrimination statutes activated by any person
believing themselves to be aggrieved (usually an employee but
sometimes a person denied employment);
Federal environmental statutes with 'citizen suit' provisions
activated by any person (typically a special interest law firm);
and
Product liability actions activated by injured consumers.

The False Claims Act (31 USC s. 3729ff.) applies to government
contractors and anyone who submits 'claims' (typically invoices)
to the federal government. The act has been applied to defence
contractors, providers of services funded by Medicare, and
drillers of oil on government land, among others. The key to its
role in improving corporate governance is the `whistleblower'
provision which permits 'any person' with knowledge of
overbilling:
(1) to bring a suit against the company to recover the
government's overpayment; and
(2) to receive a percentage (ranging from 15-3096) of the total
amount recovered.
In recent years, individual plaintiffs have been responsible for
the recovery of nearly $2 billion by the federal government. In
addition, their actions have brought to light systemic failures of
management supervision at dozens of government contractors.
The result has been the creation of the Defense Industry Initiative
on Business Ethics and Conduct (a consortium of defense
contractors committed to maintaining effective compliance
programs); the establishment of top (vice president) level
compliance posts at most major government contractors;
widespread changes in contracting practices and the replacement
of CEOs and others at the companies with the most egregious
records.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act includes a potent
provision that requires that outside auditors for a public
company include in their audit procedures specific procedures
designed to detect illegal acts (15 USC s. 78j-1 Securities and
Exchange Act, s. 10A). Where an illegality is detected, it must,
unless it is 'clearly inconsequential', be reported to the
appropriate level of management and also to the board's audit
committee. Where, in the case of significant illegality,
management fails to take appropriate corrective action, the
auditor must then go directly to the company's full board. In
turn, the board has one business day to convey the information
to the SEC; if it fails to do so, the auditor must then contact the
SEC itself Though this provision has not yet been tested, it has
the potential not only to 'force the auditor to take his role in the
identification and reporting of fraud more seriously' and to

make the auditor 'the public's fraud detective', but also to
engage board audit committees in addressing illegal activities at
a far earlier stage of development than otherwise would have
been the case.
The federal antitrust laws, too, can play a role in improving
corporate governance, as suggested by the discussion (above) of
the ADM case. Under US antitrust law, interlocking
directorships are prohibited (see 15 USC, s. 19; Clayton Act, s. 8)
and price-fixing with its exposure to treble damages can also
result in loss of position for those who run non-complying
companies. Recently, for example, Ucar International Inc, a
manufacturer of graphite electrodes, replaced its CEO and
several top-level executives, shortly before pleading guilty to a
massive international price-fixing conspiracy and paying a record
$110m fine.
—

Finally, the 'citizen suit' provisions of US environmental laws
and product liability suits under common law, also can have an
impact on corporate governance practices, though this impact
has rarely been felt. Citizen suits permit individuals to prosecute
polluters and, in effect, 'stand in the shoes of the government'.
Product liability actions permit injured individuals to sue
manufacturers of dangerous products, recovering both actual
and punitive damages. Occasionally, each type of suit has resulted
in policy and personnel changes.

—

Similarly, the federal anti-discrimination laws have proven to
be influential in shaping corporate cultures and provoking
personnel changes even at the highest levels of governance. Both
at Mitsubishi (US) and Texaco Inc, for example,
allegations of pervasive discrimination against
women (in the case of Mitsubishi) and AfricanAmericans (in the case of Texaco), have resulted in
major policy overhauls as well as reassignments at the
top. The saga at Astra USA a pharmaceutical
company at which the CEO plundered the corporate
treasury for his own (sometimes criminal) uses,
committed personal and corporate tax fraud, and
presided over a corporate culture that included the
procurement of prostitutes as 'rewards' for top sales producers,
rampant sexual harassment of female employees, discharge of
'older' women and women who became mothers, and diversions
of funds for executives' personal use became public solely
because of a handful of employees who sought to sue for sexual
harassment. The CEO, now in prison, was belatedly removed by
his board of directors and the entire senior management staff
was replaced. Without the aggressive efforts of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission together with the efforts
of Business Week, which broke the story, the mismanagement at
Astra might have gone undetected for years.

THE BOTTOM LINE
Though there are certainly some critics, a majority of
Americans have concluded that multiple sources of influence,
including regulatory statutes, statutes providing incentives for
employees and others to blow the whistle on their bosses,
shareholders' derivative suits, corporate criminal liability and,
occasionally, direct government intervention, can collectively
generate better corporate citizenship and better corporate
governance than a rudimentary system of self-regulation.

—

—

By contrast, in the UK, a business environment which, on the
surface at least, looks much like that in the US, many of the
mechanisms upon which we rely in the US are weak or nonexistent. 'This suggests two possibilities:
(1) British business leaders are less rapacious and better
behaved than American business leaders and do not require
the web of enforcement mechanisms that Americans
require to keep them on the right course; or
(2) British business leaders are just as self-serving and/or
negligent as American business leaders but, because there
are so few mechanisms by which their misconduct can be
detected, are getting away with a great deal of improper
conduct.
I doubt that either is entirely the case. Still, the differences in
the systems are striking. It is fair to wonder if these differences
are the result of historical quirks or of genuine cultural
differences.
Whatever the case let me dose this review with an
observation: as the Labour government considers a retreat from
Foss v Harbottle, the possibility of codifying corporate
manslaughter, and a possible revision of company law, there will
be many opportunities to create mechanisms designed to
strengthen corporate governance in Britain. Each mechanism
has its costs; each imposes another layer of expectation on
corporate managers. As always, the question is one of balance.

